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COMMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR TORT ACTIONS
IN OKLAHOMA: THE GOVERNMENTAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will attempt to define the status of sovereign immunity in
Oklahoma as it pertains to the state and its political subdivisions. To
facilitate this discussion, a brief review of the doctrine's history will be
presented first.1 The primary focus will be on the new Oklahoma Gov-
ernmental Tort Claims Act.2 The Act was passed by the Oklahoma leg-
islature in response to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Vanderpool v. State.' In Vanderpool, the court overturned the judicially
created sovereign immunity laws of the state.4 It is hoped that this Com-
ment will inform the reader of the operation and potential impact of the
new Act. It is this writer's position that due to the extensive limitations
and exemptions to liability contained in the Act, for all practical pur-
poses, sovereign immunity is alive and well in Oklahoma.
II. BACKGROUND
A. English History
America's sovereign immunity laws have ancestral roots in English
common law.' Under the feudal system of government established in
England during the middle ages, a lord could not be sued in his own
1. See infra notes 2-67 and accompanying text.
2. The Governmental Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-171 (Supp. 1984) (herein-
after referred to as the Act) (effective October 1, 1985; amending the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981)).
3. Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
4. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
5. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924). See also Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1963); Pugh, Histori-
cal Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953); Barry, The King
Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 349 (1925).
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court, but he could be sued in the court of a superior lord.6 Since there
were no superior courts to that of the king, the legal maxim-"the King
can do no wrong"-came into being.7 Although there is some question
as to the exact meaning of this maxim,8 it appears that the immunity
enjoyed by the king was personal and based on the idea that no court in
England could obtain jurisdiction over the king, unless he consented to
the action.9
However, even this immunity to jurisdiction was not absolute, be-
cause several remedies were available to the king's subjects for wrongs
committed against them by the king."0 As the king's power increased in
England, the personal immunity enjoyed by him was slowly transferred
to the symbol of the crown and eventually to the government." By the
time of the American Revolution, the concept of sovereign immunity was
well established in English common law, though the rationale for the
concept was rooted in the middle ages.' 2
B. Early American History
It seems illogical that our founding fathers would have wished to
carry over into American common law the medieval concept of sovereign
immunity, with the associated implications of a government which can
not be held responsible for its actions."3 Although the Constitution does
not specifically address the question of governmental immunity for tor-
tious conduct, Article III, Section 2, in addressing the scope of the fed-
eral court system, does state that the "judicial Power shall extend. . . to
Controversies. . . between a State and Citizens of another State." This
implies that the founding fathers contemplated occasions when a citizen
would bring suit directly against state governments. "4 For example, in
6. Spector, State Sovereign Immunity in Tort: Oklahoma's Long And Tortuous Road, 34
OKLA. L. RaV. 526, 526 (1981). See also Pugh, supra note 5, at 478.
7. Borchard, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Id. at 2 n.2 (true meaning of maxim was that the king was not privileged to do wrong). See
id. at 4 (quoting Blackstone that the king was incapable of thinking or doing any wrong). See also
Pugh, supra note 5, at 479; Jaffe, supra note 5, at 3-4.
9. Borchard, supra note 5, at 4; see Pugh, supra note 5, at 478.
10. See Borchard, supra note 5, at 5; Pugh, supra note 5, at 479-80; Jaffe, supra note 5, at 1-3,
18-19.
11. Pugh, supra note 5, at 478-79 & n. II (with the downfall of feudalism, restraints on the
powers of the king vanished; in essence the king became the state).
12. See id. at 480-81. See also Borchard, supra note 5, at 2; Spector, supra note 6, at 527-28.
13. Pugh, supra note 5, at 480-81; Spector, supra note 6, at 527.
14. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 481. But see id. at 481-83 (arguments by Hamilton, Madison,
and Marshall that Constitution did not give citizens right to sue state).
[Vol. 20:561
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TORT CLAIMS ACT
the early Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,15 the Court
held that a state was subject to an action in assumpsit, brought by a
citizen of another state. 16
The Chisholm decision renewed the concerns state leaders had ex-
pressed during the constitutional debates, that a state could be subject to
a suit brought by a citizen of another state and that a subsequent judg-
ment could be obtained against the state's treasury. 17 Judgments against
state treasuries were of special concern to early legislators because of the
size of the state debts that had accumulated during the Revolutionary
War. 8 Legislators feared that permitting a state to be sued by a private
citizen would result in a flood of suits brought against the various states
by creditors who wished to collect on outstanding war debts, thereby
draining funds from the state treasuries.19
Wishing to avoid either higher taxes or complete bankruptcy of state
treasuries and responding in part to Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution was proposed and ratified."0 The Eleventh Amend-
ment removed the power of the federal courts to hear claims brought
against a state by a citizen of another state."1
After the doctrine of sovereign immunity for states in federal courts
was established through the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine was ex-
tended to the federal government by the Supreme Court in Cohens v.
Virginia.2 Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the principle in Cohens, but
he did not supply any justification for the extension other than to state:
"[T]he universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not au-
thorize such suits."2 3 It appears the doctrine of sovereign immunity had
been accepted so readily by all from the English common law that the
15. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
16. Id. at 469-79. Only one justice dissented from this decision. His dissent was based on the
argument that the Court should look to the applicable common law, which was that consent to the
suit by the legislature was required. Id. at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Wilson specifically
rejected the whole concept of sovereign immunity in his concurring opinion. Id. at 453.
17. Pugh, supra note 5, at 485; Jaffe, supra note 5, at 19-20. See also supra note 14.
18. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 485.
19. Id.
20. Id. See also Jaffe, supra note 5, at 20.
21. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. This amendment has also
been construed to bar unconsented to suits brought against a state by a citizen of that state. Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
22. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
23. Id. at 411-12.
1985]
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Court felt no compulsion to explain or justify its reasoning.24 This judi-
cial procedure of acceptance without independent justification was also
reflected in the activities of the state courts, resulting in the total incorpo-
ration of the doctrine into state common law.25
The doctrine remained firmly entrenched in American legal practice
throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Although sev-
eral justifications for immunity have been expounded upon by the courts
since Cohens,2 6 none have been received with much critical support.27 In
fact, throughout those years of acceptance, there were many scholarly
attacks on the doctrine.28
Significant erosion of the doctrine began after World War 11.29 This
erosion was the result of a failure to find a sufficiently rational theory to
justify the immunity doctrine and the fact that, where the immunity had
been waived, the resulting judgments did not bring about the fiscal de-
mise of the state." During this period, the federal government, as well as
most state governments, either judicially or legislatively, began to open
up the courts to tort actions brought by individuals against the govern-
ment entity.31
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN OKLAHOMA PRE-VANDERPOOL
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort actions was first ac-
cepted by the Oklahoma courts during its territorial days in James v.
Trustees of Wellston Township.32 In the typical fashion of many state
24. See Pugh, supra note 5, at 485-86.
25. See Spector, supra note 6, at 529 & n.20. See also Pugh, supra note 5, at 486-87; id. at 489
(discussing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)).
26. Courts have attempted to rationalize the doctrine on the theory "... that it would be
inconsistent with the very idea of supreme executive power, and would endanger the performance of
the public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits. . . ." Briggs v. Light-Boats
Upper Cedar Point, 93 Mass. (I1 Allen) 157, 162 (1865); see also Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S.
122, 126 (1868) (sovereign immunity is founded upon public policy which is imposed by necessity);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S 196, 206 (1882) (improper to force a state to submit to the jurisdiction
of a court which it created); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ([T]here can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
27. See Spector, supra note 6, at 529 n.21. See generally Pugh, supra note 5, at 486-94.
28. See, eg., Borchard, supra note 5, at 4-9; Pugh, supra note 5, at 486-94. See also Spector,
supra note 6, at 560-61 (author argues that there is no valid justification today for sovereign immu-
nity in Oklahoma).
29. Spector, supra note 6, at 529.
30. Id. at 529-30.
31. Id.
32. 18 Okla. 56, 90 P. 100 (1907). A private citizen brought suit against a township for dam-
ages allegedly sustained by the township's failure to properly maintain a highway in a reasonably
safe condition. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that absent a specific statute imposing liabil-
ity, the township (as well as the state) was immune from liability. Id. at 74, 90 P. at 106.
[Vol. 20:561
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courts,33 the Oklahoma Supreme Court merely accepted the doctrine on
"public policy" grounds without any attempt to justify the doctrine or to
explain the public policy34 rationale. The court provided potential es-
cape from the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by stat-
ing that if the state legislature passed a statute creating liability in the
state, the court would have to allow the suit based on the legislature's
intent to consent to the suit.
35
Problems with this dictum were two-fold. First, although the court
spoke in terms of consent to liability, there are two aspects involved in a
state waiving its immunity; consent to liability and consent to suit.
36
Both aspects had to be present for a plaintiff to bring a successful tort
action against the state. The second problem with the dictum resulted
from state courts strictly construing all statutes which purportedly
waived the state's immunity to tort actions brought against it. 37 These
factors resulted in the state obtaining a "broad-based protection from
liability" that few plaintiffs were able to overcome.38
In the early 1900's, plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the state's
immunity protection by recharacterizing their tort claims as an unconsti-
tutional taking of private property.39 The Oklahoma Constitution states:
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. ". . . [P]ubliec policy would dictate that the state, [including its subordinate political subdi-
visions] for a failure to perform a public duty, would not be liable in civil damages to a citizen. ...."
James, 18 Okla. at 58, 90 P. at 101.
35. Id. at 74, 90 P. at 106.
36. See Spector, supra note 6, at 530 n.24.
37. See Board of Comm'rs v. Twyford, 39 Okla. 230, 143 P. 968 (1913). Plaintiff was seeking to
recover from the county for services rendered as a pro tempore county judge. Plaintiff based his
argument on language contained in the law setting forth the fee that a temporary judge could charge
which stated: ". . . and in no event shall the county be liable for more than one-half of such costs."
Act of March 19, 1910, ch. 21, art. I, § 1832, vol. I, Rev. Laws of Okla. Ann., 482, 482. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that all statutes purporting to give costs must be strictly construed to
exclude the sovereign and that the language quoted above ". . . fell far short of saying that in such
cases the county shall be liable for these fees." Twyford, 39 Okla. at 232-33, 134 P. at 969-70. See
also Whiteneck v. Board of Comm'rs, 89 Okla. 52, 213 P. 865 (1923) (workman's compensation
statute construed to only waive state's immunity to suit, not liability); Consolidated School Dist. No.
1 v. Wright, 128 Okla. 193, 261 P. 953 (1927) ("sue and be sued" clause contained in school district
enabling statute was construed by Oklahoma Supreme Court as not to include suits for negligence,
but only referred to suits over matters within the school district's normal scope of duties).
38. Spector, supra note 6, at 532.
39. Welker v. Annett, 44 Okla. 520, 145 P. 411 (1914) (the state killed several of plaintiff's
cattle due to the negligent manner in which the state performed a cattle dipping operation it was
required to perform under Oklahoma law. In order to show that the state had waived its immunity,
plaintiff attempted to recharacterize his claim as an unconstitutional taking of private property by
the state under OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24).
1985]
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just compensation."'' The theory behind the recharacterization was that
through the "taking of private property for public use" clause of the
Constitution, the state had waived its immunity.4" In Welker v. Arn-
nett,42 the court rejected the plaintiff's attempted recharacterization. 43
Through strict construction of the Constitution, the court held that since
"the damages are purely consequential, and not the direct and immediate
result of the tortious act of the defendant, we cannot give our assent to
this proposition." 44 The court cited no authority for its direct versus
consequential distinction with respect to damages.45 It can only be ex-
plained as a very narrow construction of the phrase "[p]rivate property
. . . damaged for public use. .. ,46 as used in the Constitution.
As a result of the state judiciary's almost automatic acceptance of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its strict construction of all legis-
lation purporting to waive the state's immunity in tort actions, "the state
and its subdivisions were wholly immune, both from suit and [liability],
for the tortious acts of its agents . . ." through the 1920's.47
During the 1930's, attacks on state sovereign immunity centered on
special individualized acts brought before the legislature.48 Such acts
40. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24.
41. Because of the dictum in James, which stated that if the state had legislatively created
liability in itself the courts would have to assume the state intended to waive its immunity and
consent to the suit, plaintiffs sought to use the Oklahoma Constitution with respect to the "taking of
private property for public use" clause to supply the necessary legislative waiver of immunity. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. 44 Okla. 520, 145 P. 411 (1914).
43. Id. at 522, 145 P. at 412.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24.
47. Spector, supra note 6, at 535. Only actions for property damages resulting directly from
state conduct were allowed, on the theory the state had waived its immunity completely in those
types of actions based on OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 24. Id. In Board of Comm'rs v. Baxter, 113 Okla.
280, 241 P. 752 (1925), a private citizen was granted an exclusive franchise by an Oklahoma county
to build a toll road in the county. After construction of the road was completed, the country re-
voked the franchise and seized the road. When the citizen sued, the county sought to avoid liability
by claiming that the seizure of the road was a tortious act of its officers for which the county had
immunity against liability. Id. at 283, 241 P. at 756. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that this
case fell within the James exception and that the "taking of private property for public use" clause of
the state constitution was a legislative waiver of the county's immunity to liability for the tortious
actions of its officers in this case. Id. Though never expressly stated by the court, it apparently
found the plaintiff's damages to be a direct result of the county's tortious act, instead of a conse-
quential result as found in the earlier Welker case. Baxter also supported the implication raised in
the Welker case, that if a plaintiff could show his damages were the direct result of an unconstitu-
tional taking by the state, then OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 24 acted as a complete legislative waiver of
the state's immunity. However, in Baxter and Welker, the court never made any attempt to distin-
guish between immunity to suit and immunity to liability.
48. Spector, supra note 6, at 537.
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sought to obtain the legislature's consent to the tort action and thereby
allow the plaintiff to proceed with his cause of action against the state
within the courts.4 9 For the most part, attempts to obtain legislative
consent failed.5 0 The court persisted in focusing on the dual nature of
the immunity 1 and in holding that in tort actions, waiver of immunity to
suit could be obtained on an individualized basis from the state legisla-
ture,5" but waiver to liability on an individualized basis was unconstitu-
tional.53 Therefore, unless there was a preexisting obligation owed to the
plaintiff by the state54 or the plaintiff could show existing legislation that
contained a general waiver of the immunity to liability,55 the state's im-
munity to tort actions would be upheld by the courts.
5 6
49. See, ag., Hawks v. Bland, 156 Okla. 48, 9 P.2d 720 (1932). The Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to require the state to pay a five thousand dollar death benefit, which had been approved by a
legislative resolution, to the widow of a state employee who died as the result of injuries sustained in
the course of his employment. The court held that the benefit was an unconstitutional gift of public
moneys for private purposes, as the statute sought to appropriate money to a person to whom the
state had no legal obligation. Id. at 49-51, 9 P.2d at 722-24; see also Wright v. Carter, 161 Okla. 281,
18 P.2d 522 (1933) (selective waiver of immunity to liability was fatal to legislative resolution al-
lowing plaintiff to bring his action against the state, even though the resolution did not assume state
liability as it did in Bland, but only allowed plaintiff to present his claim to the Industrial Commis-
sion for determination of liability); State v. Fletcher, 168 Okla. 538, 34 P.2d 595 (1934) (action to
recover damages to plaintiff's dairy cattle herd, directly caused by the state's action, where a legisla-
tive resolution waiving only immunity to suit was upheld by the court).
50. See, eg., Bland, 156 Okla. 48, 9 P.2d 720 (1932); Wright, 161 Okla. 281, 18 P.2d 522
(1933).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (immunity to suit and immunity to liability).
52. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 187 Okla. 673, 676-77, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (1940) (waiver of immu-
nity to suit on an individual basis not unconstitutional).
53. Id. at 677, 105 P.2d at 419-20. The court distinguished Jack v. State on the basis that the
special act in Jack sought not only to waive immunity to suit but also immunity to liability on an
individual basis which was unconstitutional. Jack, 183 Okla. 375, 82 P.2d 1033 (1937). In Jack, the
legislative resolution directed to one specific individual, waiving the state's immunity to liability, was
held unconstitutional as it violated OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 59 which requires that "where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted." Jack, 183 Okla. at 376-77, 380, 82
P.2d at 1034, 1038.
54. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Horn, 187 Okla. 605, 608, 105 P.2d 234, 237 (1940)
(court citing with approval a Pennsylvania case that held where liability is preexisting, waiver of
immunity to suit by a special act is constitutional). See also Spector, supra note 6, at 546 n.84
(author discusses a series of cases involving preexisting obligation owed to a plaintiff due to the
improper withholding of tax money from plaintiff by the state).
55. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 168 Okla. 538, 540, 34 P.2d 595, 597 (1934) (court held that
article 2, section 24, of the state constitution acted as a general waiver of immunity to liability
available to all citizens who have had private property taken or damaged by the state).
56. The only exception to this general proviso appeared to be in the area of eminent domain.
If plaintiff's land had directly been taken he could sue in inverse condemnation, and article
2, section 24 was interpreted as waiving both substantive immunity and immunity from
suit. If, however, plaintiff's damages were merely consequential to the state's construction
of a public improvement, article 2, section 24 was held to provide the basis of state liability;
unfortunately there was no remedy available. If the legislature authorized plaintiff's suit in
a special bill, he could proceed; if they did not, he was remediless.
Spector, supra note 6, at 546.
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After the brief flurry of activity during the 1930's noted above, the
status of Oklahoma's sovereign immunity laws remained unchanged for
the most part until the 1970's. 7 It was during the 1970's that the
Oklahoma courts and Legislature began to respond to the growing dis-
satisfaction being expressed about the retention of sovereign immunity by
the state in tort actions.
During this period the governmental versus proprietary activity lim-
itation on immunity, long applied to municipalities,58 was extended by
the court to counties,5 9 and eventually in 1980 to the state and its agen-
cies." Under the governmental versus proprietary distinction, sovereign
immunity was waived for all tortious conduct that was committed by the
governmental unit in its proprietary capacity, but the immunity was re-
tained for conduct performed in its governmental capacity. 61 The test,
however, proved difficult to apply except in the most obvious situations,
which resulted in the courts having to make decisions concerning the
distinction on a case by case basis.62
The 1970's also saw a further erosion of the state's sovereign immu-
nity due to liability insurance purchased by the state.6 Where the state
purchased liability insurance to cover specific situations, the courts
would imply that the governmental unit had consented to waiving its
immunity as to those situations." The basis for this exception was that
"insurance companies would be receiving premiums on policies and they
would never have to honor any claims. The courts refuse to extend the
57. Id. at 547.
58. See Oklahoma City v. Hill, 6 Okla. 114, 50 P. 242 (1897) (municipality immune from
liability for torts arising out of actions connected with governmental functions, but no immunity
where tortious act connected with proprietary functions).
59. See Terry v. Edgin, 598 P.2d 228 (Okla. 1979) (counties can be held liable for their tortious
acts committed during performance of proprietary functions).
60. See Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1980) (state not immune from
liability for tortious conduct arising from state proprietary functions).
61. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1053 (5th ed,
1984) (although the author is addressing municipal immunity, the principle of the governmental
versus proprietary distinction is the same for counties and the state).
62. See Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237, 243 (Okla. 1980) (Opala, J., dissent-
ing) "State functions do not naturally fall into a dichotomous governmental/proprietary division.
Our attempt to so arrange them is bound to be productive of much sophistry via a strained applica-
tion of ill-suited test criteria." Hershel, 610 P.2d at 243. See generally Spector, supra note 6, at 554-
56 (author states that the court has not been clear on how the distinction is to be applied); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, at 1053-54 (authors claim there is no rational solution
because the distinction itself is unworkable).
63. See Spector, supra note 6, at 556-59.
64. See Lamont Indep. School Dist. 1-95 v. Swanson, 548 P.2d 215, 217 (Okla. 1976) (court
extended liability insurance exception established in Schrom v. State Indus. Dev., 536 P.2d 904
(Okla. 1975) (by dropping the requirement that the purchase of liability insurance had to be specifi-
cally authorized by the legislature, but requiring only that the insurance was actually purchased).
(Vol. 20:561
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doctrine of sovereign immunity to the insured and the insured is es-
topped from claiming acts of the sovereign are governmental or proprie-
tary."'65 However, this waiver of the immunity was not complete. It was
assumed that the governmental entity had only waived its immunity up
to the amount covered by the insurance policy. 6 If the plaintiff sought
damages in excess of the policy amount, he had to base his claims for the
excess on some other exception to the governmental unit's sovereign
immunity.67
In summary, the status of Oklahoma's sovereign immunity law prior
to the Vanderpool v. State68 decision, was that the state enjoyed complete
immunity in tort actions brought against it unless: 1. the tortious activ-
ity in which the state was involved was being conducted in a proprietary,
as opposed to a governmental, capacity;69 or 2. the state had purchased
liability insurance, in which case implied consent to waive its immunity
was assumed, up to the amount of the policy;70 or 3. the plaintiff had
obtained a "constitutionally complete" consent from the legislature to
bring his tort cause of action against the state in its courts.
71
IV. THE VanderpooP2 DECISION
As late as March 1983, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to
overturn the doctrine of sovereign immunity within the state.73 It based
its refusal on the belief that "if sovereign immunity is to be abrogated, it
should be done by the Legislature and not by the courts."'74 The view
that the legislature, and not the judiciary, should be responsible for over-
turning the state's sovereign immunity laws was attacked by sources both
65. Berry, The Dragon of Sovereign Immunity-A Delay of the Slaying?, 50 OKLA. B.J. 884, 886
(1979). See also Comment, Torts: Sovereign Immunity: The Changing Doctrine of the Immunity of
the State in Tort in Oklahoma, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 592, 596 (1972) (the rationale for sovereign immu-
nity is to protect public funds; if the state has obtained insurance the rationale for the immunity
ceases).
66. See, eg., Lamont, 548 P.2d at 217 (Oklahoma Supreme Court held that obtaining liability
insurance was a waiver of the governmental immunity only up to the extent of the insurance
coverage).
67. Berry, supra note 65, at 886.
68. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
69. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
72. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
73. See Ruble v. State Dep't of Transp., 660 P.2d 1049 (Okla. 1983) (court held that building
and maintaining state highways was a governmental function for which the state retained immunity
against any liability arising therefrom).
74. Id. at 1050.
1985]
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inside75 and outside the court.76 These attacks were based on the fact
that the state's sovereign immunity laws were judicially created.77
In July, 1983, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Vanderpool v.
State71 finally reviewed its position on the sovereign immunity issue. The
plaintiff in Vanderpool was an employee of the Oklahoma Historical So-
ciety at one of the state's historical sites.79 Plaintiff was injured on the
grounds of the historical site during the course of her working hours by a
defective mower operated by a fellow employee.80 The injury resulted in
permanent loss of sight in her right eye."' Plaintiff alleged negligence on
the part of the state and the state agency (hereinafter referred to as de-
fendants) in maintaining and operating the defective mower.8 2
Defendants made a motion for summary judgment in district
75. See, eg., Walton v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 590 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Okla. 1978) (Opala, J.,
specially concurring) "The archaic concept of immunity unfairly singles out our government, qua
tortfeasor, for a legal treatment that is vastly more favorable than that accorded an ordinary citizen
whose actionable conduct inflicts injury on another person." Id. at 1195; State Dep't of Highways v.
McKnight, 496 P.2d 775, 784 (Okla. 1972) (Hodges, J., dissenting) "[Tihe doctrine of governmental
immunity as court made law should be abrogated." Id.; Newman v. State Bd. of Regents, 490 P.2d
1079, 1081, 1085 (Okla. 1972) (Hodges & McInerney, JJ., dissenting) "Governmental immunity is
an anachronism that has long outlived its purposes, design or reasoning. The doctrine had its dubi-
ous inception in the feudal days where the authority was the King having some claim of divine rights
and the medieval notion that the King can do no wrong." Id. at 1081 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
"Needless to say the ancient reasons are no longer applicable, if they ever were. We have no king
and no claim of divinity for our government has been asserted. Yesterday's excuses are not today's
answers." Id. at 1082. "The reasons for abolishing the doctrine of governmental immunity are over-
whelming and persuasive. A primitive concept that prevents a person from being justly compensated
for a serious, painful and permanent injury just because the wrong doer was an employee of the state
should be reexamined and altered." Id. at 1085. "I believe Justice Hodges is correct in his analysis,
and criticism, of the outmoded doctrine of governmental immunity when applied to [this
case] .. " Id. (McInerey, J., dissenting).
76. See Spector, supra note 6, at 560. "No commentator in the last half-century has proffered a
good word concerning sovereign immunity. A legal system that 'singles out our government, qua
tortfeasor, for legal treatment that is vastly more favorable than accorded an ordinary citizen' is
inherently unfair." Id. (quoting Justice Opala's dissent in Walton v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 590 P.2d
1190, 1194 (Okla. 1978). See Berry, supra note 65, at 886-88. "It would seem that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is headed for the scrapheap to join. . . other unfair and antiquated doctrines
that have lingered in our law for much longer than they should have. Oklahoma courts should
realize the idea that the King can do no wrong has no business in our legal system." Id. at 887-888.
77. See Spector, supra note 6, at 560.
The entire history of this doctrine shows that, apart from the motor vehicle immunity
statutes, sovereign immunity was created by the court, modified often by the court, and on
at least one occasion, overturned by the court. There is no sound policy reason for the
court to believe it has the power to overturn contractual immunity but not tort immunity.
The time is long past when the court can disclaim responsibility for its own progeny.
Id.




82. Id. at 1153-54.
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court. 3 The defendants based their motion on the claim that their con-
duct was governmental in nature and therefore immune from tort ac-
tions.84 The district court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed
the plaintiff's action.85 Plaintiff then appealed the district court's deci-
sion to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.86
The supreme court first reviewed the status of the Oklahoma Histor-
ical Society. After considering the "nature, purposes, powers and du-
ties" of the Society as set forth in its enabling statute, the court found the
Society to be "an agency of the State."8" The court then noted that:
"[t]he case before us places squarely in issue the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and impels us to reexamine the viability and efficacy of that
doctrine as applied to tort liability of the State, the counties and of other
governmental entities within the State of Oklahoma."88
Next, the court briefly reviewed the history of sovereign immunity,
from its ancient English roots, through its incorporation into American
common law, and finally to its adoption by the states.89 The court re-
viewed the governmental versus proprietary distinction, noting that with
the increased complexity of modern governments, it was becoming al-
most impossible for courts to make the distinction.9" The court took
note of the inroads made into the doctrine of sovereign immunity by the
federal government, 91 by sister states,92 and even with respect to its appli-
cation in Oklahoma.93





88. Id. The language used by the court was especially important in that it spelled out the all-
encompassing scope its reexamination was to have with respect to tort sovereign immunity.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1154-55. The court stated that "[j]udicial attempts to grapple with what has become
a multi-addered medusa has resulted in confusion and uncertainty all too painfully apparent to legal
scholars, and an inability on the part of the courts to evolve any definitive guide lines for the demar-
cation between governmental and proprietary functions." Id.
91. Id. at 1155. Through the Federal Tort Claims Act, initially adopted in 1946, the federal
government waived its immunity
. . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
92. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1155. The court noted that only five states, including Oklahoma,
had not abolished or severely restricted the application of the doctrine. Id.
93. Id. The court cited to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51,
§§ 151-170 (1981) (extending liability to state political subdivisions, i.e. counties, cities, public trusts
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After completing its review of the history of sovereign immunity,
the court held "that the governmental-proprietary-function inquiry shall
no longer be determinative in assessing liability for torts as to all levels of
government in this State.",94 The court then announced that the new
standard for determining the State's liability in tort causes of action
would be:
A state or local govermental entity is liable for money damages
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any governmental entity or
any employee or agent of the governmental entity while acting within
the scope of the governmental entity's office, and purpose for which it
is created, under circumstances where the entity, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
Provided, however, said governmental entity is immune from tort
liability for acts and omissions constituting
(a) the exercise of a legislative or judicial function, and
(b) the exercise of an administrative function involving the de-
termination of fundamental governmental policy.
And futher provided, that the repudiation of general tort immu-
nity as hereinabove set forth does not establish liability for an act or
omission that is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.95
The new standard set forth by the court closely resembles that ex-
pressed in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 96 Namely, the state and its
political subdivisions would be held to the same tort standard as a private
person in the same situation, subject to certain limitations.97 The new
standard is very broad in scope, especially in light of the few exceptions
listed.98
and school districts, for the tortious conduct of its employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment or duties, with specified limitations to the liability); Hershel v. Univ. Hosp. Found., 610
P.2d 237 (Okla. 1980) (no immunity for tortious conduct performed by the state in its proprietary
capacity); Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940) (no immunity for charitable
corporations similar to sovereign immunity); and Schrom v. Okla. Indus. Dev., 536 P.2d 904 (Okla.
1975) (purchase of liability insurance by governmental agency pursuant to legislative authority con-
stitutes a consensual waiver of sovereign immunity up to the policy limit).
94. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1156.
95. Id. at 1156-57 (note that the decision as published is printed with the cited quote appearing
entirely in capital letters).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982); see supra note 91.
97. Sovereign immunity will still apply to the service of legislative and judicial functions by
governmental entities as well as to administrative functions which involve the determination of fun-
damental governmental policy. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157. The court noted that the new stan-
dard did not create any new liability for acts that were otherwise privileged or not tortious. Id. The
court also noted that the state would still not be liable for punitive damages. Id. at n.10.
98. By comparison, the Federal Tort Claims Act contains many substantive and procedural
limitations to liability, and there have been numerous judicial interpretations of the statutory lan-
[Vol. 20:561
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The court concluded its opinion in Vanderpool by stating it nor-
mally would have deferred a decision such as this to the legislature;
[b]ut having come to the conclusion that the judicially recognized doc-
trine of governmental immunity in its present state under the case law
is no longer supportable in reason, justice or in light of the overwhelm-
ing trend against its recognition, our duty is clear. Where the reason
for the rule no longer exists, that alone should toll its death knell. 99
The court, in deference to the legislature, specifically limited its rul-
ing to the "judicially created and recognized doctrine of governmental
immunity""'' and noted that its holding had no impact on "any act of
the Legislature in the area of governmental immunity whether presently
in effect or hereafter passed."101 In further deference to the legislature,
the court specifically stated that its opinion, with the exception of the
present case, would not become effective until October 1, 1985.102
By setting the effective date of the opinion over two years into the
future, the court hoped to provide the legislature with ample time to con-
sider the whole area of sovereign immunity and its applicability in the
state.10 3 In fact, the court expressed the opinion that the legislature may
wish to reinstate the doctrine of sovereign immunity by statute, implying
that it would be constitutionally permissible."m The opinion further im-
plies that the court no longer wanted to be held responsible for the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in Oklahoma. 0 5
Three justices dissented from the majority opinion.106 Justice Irwin
noted that the abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should
guage further limiting the scope of the Act. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
61, at 1035-40 (discussing the various limitations).
99. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157.
100. Id. (emphasis added); see also Spector, supra note 6, at 560 (practically all law in the area of
state sovereign immunity was judicially created).
101. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157.
102. Id.
103. We are aware of and sensitive to the effect that the immediate application of the rules
of law herein enunciated would have upon the various governmental entities affected
thereby. These are matters which lie within the sphere of the Legislature alone. We invoke
its consideration of the many problems presented, including whether some or all of the
governmental entities should be insulated from unlimited tort liability through the enact-
ment of comprehensive or specific Tort Claims Acts which limit or prescribe conditions of
liability, their insurance against loss, the maximum monetary liability to be allowed ...
Ample time for consideration of these matters must be afforded.
Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157.
104. Id. The court in its opinion asked the legislature to consider "[w]hether it is the will of the
People of the State of Oklahoma, as expressed through the Legislature, that governmental immunity
be established by statute. ... Id.
105. See Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157 (Barnes, C.J., Irwin, J. & Hargrave, J., dissenting).
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come from the legislature, not the courts. 10 7 He supported his position
by noting that the legislature has had ample opportunity to abolish sover-
eign immunity if it so desired."' 8 Moreover, the fact that the Legislature
had not chosen to abrogate sovereign immunity was, in Justice Irwin's
opinion, a clear demonstration of legislative intent to retain the doctrine
in its present form.10 9
V. OKLAHOMA'S GOVERNMENTAL TORT CLAIMS ACT1 10
A. Analysis of the Act
The court in Vanderpool sought to give the Oklahoma Legislature
ample time to consider its position on sovereign immunity by setting the
effective date of the court's decision at October 1, 1985.11 It did not take
the legislature the full two years to consider its position; on May 23, 1984
the Governmental Tort Claims Act was passed.1 12
In drafting the Act, the legislature extensively used the then existing
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act,1 13 as the framework for the new
Act.' 14 The Act is designed to be implemented in two stages. The first
stage addresses only political subdivision liability in tort actions and be-
came effective July 1, 1984.115 The second stage establishes the liability
of the state and its agencies, with an effective date of October 1, 1985.116
107. Id. at 1158.
108. Id. The Legislature had acted in the area of sovereign immunity in the past by enacting the
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981) (abolishing sovereign
immunity for municipalities, school districts, counties and certain public trusts, within stated liabil-
ity limitations); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 157.1-158.2 (1981) (requiring insurance for state owned
motor vehicles and equipment and waiving sovereign immunity up to the limits of the policy); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, § 20f-20h (1981) (requiring the Attorney General to defend state officers and employ-
ees sued in performance of their official duties, but expressly excluding the payment by the state of
any judgment subsequently rendered against that official or employee).
109. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1158.
110. Governmental Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-171 (Supp. 1984) (effective
October 1, 1985; amending The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-
170 (1981); hereinafter referred to as the Act).
111. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1157; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-171 (Supp. 1984) (effective October 1, 1985).
113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981).
114. The Act was written amending the original Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and to a
large extent it utilized the structure of that act. See Public Officers and Employees-Tort Liability,
1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 226, 811 (containing that portion of the Act which becomes effective
October 1, 1985) and Public Officers and Employees-Tort Liability, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 228,
825 (containing that portion of the Act which became effective July 1, 1984).
115. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 152-155, 157, 163
(Supp. 1984); see also 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 228, 825, 832.
116. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-171 (Supp. 1984); see also 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 226,
811, 821. It appears the legislature wished to delay enactment of the new law until the effective date
of the Vanderpool decision. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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With the exception of the exclusion of the state and its agencies, there is
very little substantive difference between the two stages,117 and, there-
fore, this comment will only discuss the Act as it appears in its final,
complete form.
1. Sovereign Immunity Statutorily Established
By section 152.1(A) of the Act, the Oklahoma Legislature incorpo-
rates the doctrine of sovereign immunity, with respect to tort liability,
into state law.118 The immunity covers "[t]he state, its political subdivi-
sions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions .. ."119
Two points should be noted with respect to the scope of immunity.
First, immunity attaches only in situations where the tortious conduct
was performed within the scope of employment of the party committing
the wrong. 2' Thus, there is no immunity for actions outside the scope of
employment. If a plaintiff can show that the defendant was acting
outside the scope of his employment, the defendant will be barred from
raising the immunity defense and the plaintiff, while having a defendant
against whom he may bring an action, will not be able to get at the deep
pockets of the government entity.121 The Act defines "scope of employ-
ment" as "performance by an employee acting in good faith within the
duties of his office or employment or of tasks lawfully assigned by a com-
petent authority but shall not include corruption or fraud." 122 Thus, cor-
ruption and fraud are expressly outside the scope of employment.
The second point concerning the scope of the immunity is that the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is no longer
117. Except for the addition of certain words and provisions that relate exclusively to the state,
the only significant differences between the two stages are:
1. The political subdivision act which became effective July 1, 1984, retained for the most part
the procedural rules contained in the original Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981). These procedures were significantly changed in the final Governmental
Tort Claims Act. See infra notes 184-222 and accompanying text.
2. The July 1, 1984 political subdivision act does not contain the clause which statutorily
establishes the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the state, nor the clause which waives the immu-
nity. See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
118. "The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1(A) (Supp. 1984).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. If the party committing wrong was not acting within the scope of his employment then the
governmental entity probably would not be held vicariously liable. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 61, at 502.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(8) (Supp. 1984).
1985]
15
Meyer: Sovereign Immunity for Tort Actions in Oklahoma: The Governmental
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
significant in making a determination of immunity. 12 3 This change
should receive approval by both the courts and legal scholars, who have
long criticized the distinction as being an unworkable standard "resulting
in confusion and uncertainty." 124
2. Waiver of Immunity
The general waiver clause of the Act provides that "[t]he state, only
to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, waives its immunity
and that of its political subdivisions." 1 21 Waiver of immunity is limited
to the terms specifically stated in the Act. The Legislature is thus clearly
expressing its intent that the courts are not to expand the scope of liabil-
ity to which the state or its political subdivisions may be exposed, beyond
that provided in the Act. Coupling this expression of intent with the
court's policy of strictly construing all waivers of governmental immu-
nity,126 it is doubtful a plaintiff will be able to establish a claim against
the state or its political subdivision unless his case complies strictly with
this Act.
The general waiver clause also states, "it is not the intent of the state
to waive any rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution."' 27 Since the eleventh amendment bars suits by individuals
against a state in federal court, 28 it appears a plaintiff will have to initi-
ate his cause of action in state court.
3. Standard for Finding Liability
The standard for determining liability under the Act is: "[t]he state
or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its tort or
the torts of its employees . . . only where the state or political subdivi-
sion, if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages
under the laws of this state."' 29 The standard allows that only claims for
"money damages" can be brought against the state. Sovereign immunity
is not waived for all other claims of relief. 30
123. Id. § 152.1(A).
124. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1154-55; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
125. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) (Supp. 1984).
126. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) (Supp. 1984).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
129. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 153(A) (Supp. 1984). Though the Act states that the state or polit-
ical subdivision will be liable for money damages to the same extent as if it were a private person, it
specifically excludes the award of any punitive or exemplary damages against the state or political
subdivision. Id. § 154(B).
130. The Federal Tort Claims Act uses similar language limiting liability to only claims request-
[Vol. 20:561
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This section of the Act also states that the liability that may be
charged to the state or political subdivision, as determined by the stan-
dard, is "subject to the limitations and exceptions specified in the
act. .. . Also, it is noted twice in this section that the state or polit-
ical subdivision is not liable for the acts or omissions of its employees
performed outside the scope of their employment.132 Again, the legisla-
ture placed heavy emphasis on restricting liability as much as possible.
The foregoing is apparent when considered in light of subsection B of this
section which states: "[t]he liability of a political subdivision under this
act shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the state, a
political subdivision or employee at common law or otherwise."
' 133
4. Limitations to Liability
a. Monetary limitations
Severe monetary limitations are placed on any recoveries which can
be obtained by a plaintiff. Claims against the state or political subdivi-
sions cannot exceed:
1. $25,000 per person per accident or occurrence for property
losses; 134
2. $100,000 per person per accident or occurrence for any other
type of loss 135 (except state teaching hospitals which have a $200,000
limit); and
3. $1,000,000 for all claims per accident or occurrence. 136
The third monetary limitation expressly provides that regardless of
the number of parties injured or the extent of their injuries, the state or
political subdivision cannot be held liable for more than one million dol-
lars, providing all injuries arise from the same accident or occurrence. 137
To avoid the situation where the first to sue would be the only party to
recover anything, the Act allows any party to the action to petition the
ing money damages, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). However, this has been interpreted by the federal
courts not to bar declaratory relief requested in conjunction with money damages, on the basis that
declaratory judgments are procedural. In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 153(A) (Supp. 1984).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 153(B).
134. Id. § 154(A)(1).
135. Id. § 154(A)(2).
136. Id. § 154(A)(3).
137. This may be of special concern to those who are injured by a catastrophe at a municipal
stadium or some other publicly owned facility. To reduce the hardships that might accompany such
an event, government bodies should make sure that promoters who use public facilities have suffi-
cient liability insurance to cover these situations as the government's immunity will be triggered for
any amount over one million dollars.
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court with jurisdiction for apportionment among all the parties of any
recoveries made against the state or political subdivision, if the total
award for all claims would exceed the statutory maximums. 138
Furthermore, this section of the Act gives the state or political sub-
division the right to petition the court to join all parties and actions aris-
ing out of a single accident or occurrence 139 or to "interplead in any
action which may impose on it any duty or liability pursuant to this
act." Also, the state or political subdivision can sever itself from any
other person or entity"4 and be held liable for only "that percentage of
total damages that corresponds to its percentage of total negligence" 142
up to the maximum liability limits established by this section. 143 It ap-
pears the state wishes to give itself as much flexibility as it lawfully can
obtain, while limiting the injured party's options to the greatest extent
possible.
b. Substantive limitations
There are twenty eight specifically enumerated substantive limita-
tions on governmental liability contained in the Act. 1 "4 These substan-
tive limitations can be divided into four general categories:
1. governmental, 2. police-military, 3. transportation-weather, and
4. miscellaneous.
1. governmental
The limitations in this category provide expressly for the disallow-
ance of all losses or claims arising from; legislative 141 or judicial 46 func-
tions; adoption or enforcement of or the failure to adopt or enforce any
law, whether or not such law is valid;'47 execution or enforcement of any
lawful court orders;1 48 and assessment or collection of any taxes or
fees."4 Also disallowed are any claims or losses resulting from the li-
138. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(C) (Supp. 1984).
139. Id. § 154(D).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 154(E).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. §§ 155(1)-(27), § 155.1.
145. Id. § 155(1).
146. Id. § 155(2). This exemption to liability includes quasi-judicial and prosecutorial functions.
147. Id. § 155(4).
148. Id. § 155(3).
149. Id. § 155(11) (this exemption to liability includes special assessments, license or registration
fees, or other lawfully imposed fees or charges).
[Vol. 20:561
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censing1 50 or inspection powers of the governmental unit; and any
claim relating to the placement of children by state or political subdivi-
sion employees.1 52  Finally, the Act denies liability for losses or claims
which result from acts which are within the discretionary powers of the
state, political subdivision, or an employee of either.
15 3
This last exception to liability for discretionary acts or omissions
will probably result in additional litigation, because the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in any great detail.1 54 It may
be beneficial for a thorough analysis of Oklahoma's Governmental Tort
Claims Act to look at how the federal courts have handled this issue, as
the Federal Tort Claims Act contains a similar discretionary
exception. 155
The leading federal case is Dalehite v. United States.1 56 In Dalehite,
the United States Supreme Court held that the discretionary exception to
liability would apply where the claimed tortious conduct involved gov-
ernmental policy judgments or decisions.1 57 The court equated policy
judgment with government activities at the planning level158 and to imply
that routine decisions made at the operational level of government would
not fall within the discretionary exception. 159 Other federal cases dealing
150. Id. § 155(12) (this exemption to liability includes, but is not limited to, issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of licenses).
151. Id. § 155(13) (this exemption to liability includes failure to inspect or negligent inspection
of any real or personal property).
152. Id. § 155(25).
153. Id. § 155(5).
154. There is only one Oklahoma Supreme Court decision that refers to the discretionary excep-
tion contained in the original Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. In that case the court held as a
matter of law that police and traffic regulations concerning the installation and maintenance of traffic
signs were discretionary functions, but the court did not further explain the meaning of "discretion-
ary." Ochoa v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 604, 608 (Okla. 1981).
155. No waiver of governmental immunity for "[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty .... " 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1982). The theory behind the discretionary exception is to insure that the judiciary does
not exercise any control over activities that are legislative or executive in nature and thereby preserve
the separation of power between the three branches of government. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 61, at 1039.
156. 346 U.S. 15 (1953), reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 924 (1954). The government was held not liable
for an explosion that occurred after fertilizer, made from explosive material, under government di-
rections and specifications and in accordance with a government plan, was loaded onto a ship in
Texas City. It had been claimed that the government was negligent in controlling the manufacture,
handling and shipping of the fertilizer. The Court held that since all of the culpable government
decisions were made at the planning level, the government had immunity under the discretionary
exception. Id. at 42.
157. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 40-43 (1953).
158. Id.
159. Id. Although Dalehite seemed to stretch the planning versus operational distinction to an
extreme in order to find a planning function for which the government was not liable, other federal
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specifically with the discretionary exception have focused on whether
there were any applicable standards that the government entity was re-
quired to comply with by law.16° Such cases have recognized that the
pre-existence of appropriate standards, which govern the activity of the
entity, leave little room for discretion. 161 Because of the innumerable
fact variations possible in today's complex government, the Oklahoma
courts will probably find it an arduous task to establish a single test
which is both manageable and predictable when applied to the discre-
tionary exception issue. 62 One wonders whether the legislature has re-
placed the old governmental versus proprietary distinction with an
equally vague and arbitrary standard.
2. police-military
In this grouping of substantive limitations provided for in the Act,
liability is rejected where the claim or loss results from "[c]ivil disobedi-
ence, riot, insurrection or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the
method of providing, police, law enforcement or fire protection."' l6 Lia-
bility is disavowed where it is the result of either an expressed or implied
lawful entry onto any property. 16 Moreover, claims or losses which are
the result of operations at any correctional or incarceration facility, 16S or
are related to any court-ordered or administered work release program
are exempted. 6 6 "The activities of the National Guard, the militia or
other military organization administered by the Military Department of
the State. . ." are also exempted from liability under the Act.'67 The
cases have held that after the decision has been made at the planning level, the execution of that plan
puts the activity into the operational level and, therefore, must be performed with reasonable care.
See, eg., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (the court held that after the
government had exercised its discretion to build and operate a lighthouse at a specific location, it had
to operate the facility with due care).
160. See, eg., Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1979). The case involved a claim
for damages due to the alleged unlawful acts of government agents in ordering a temporary discon-
tinuance of grazing on public lands for which valid grazing permits existed. The court of appeals
held that since there were no "fixed standards or guides" by which the government agents could
determine the necessity for the temporary closing of the grazing areas due to drought, the decision
was wholly a matter of judgment and within the discretionary exception. Id. at 980.
161. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, at 1042.
162. "The distinction between planning and operational decisions, if workable at all, is at best
difficult to apply .. " Id. at 1041. "Probably no one test will control the decision on discretion-
ary immunity." Id.
163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(6) (Supp. 1984).
164. Id. § 155(9).
165. Id. § 155(23) (exemption to liability includes the operation of jails and prisons, and any
injuries resulting from the parole or escape of prisoners or injuries between prisoners).
166. Id. § 155(21).
167. Id. § 155(22).
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military activity exception is limited to situations where conduct giving
rise to the claims was performed in accordance with lawful orders during
a riot, national disaster or military attack. 168
3. transportation-weather
This general category of substantive limitations disallows claims or
losses resulting from accidents or events occurring on public ways or in
public places due to weather conditions, 169 or from claims or losses re-
sulting from the maintenance of state highways. 170 Liability is also de-
nied for most claims or losses relating to the operation or non-operation
of traffic signs and signals.' 7 ' The Act specifically excludes liability re-
sulting from decisions concerning the initial placement, alteration or
change of traffic signs or signals, based on the fact that such decisions are
discretionary.' 72 Finally, a separate section of the Act excludes all ac-
tions or recoveries against the Oklahoma Transportation Commission,
the Oklahoma Department of Transportation or any of its officers or em-
ployees for claims or losses resulting from pre-existing defects or danger-
ous conditions, whether known or unknown, from the effective date of
the Act (October 1, 1985) to October 1, 1990.11
4. miscellaneous
The Act contains several exemptions from liability which can not be
easily grouped in one of the three general categories noted above. Claims
covered by any worker's compensation or employer's liability acts,'7
claims which are limited or barred by law,'75 and claims arising from
acts or omissions that conform "with then current recognized stan-
dards" 17 6 are all excluded. Claims arising from the act or omission of
independent contractors or third parties not directly employed by the
168. Id.
169. Id. § 155(8) (exception is not available if the condition was caused by the affirmative negli-
gence of the state or political subdivision).
170. Id. § 155(27) (exception is not available if the state failed to warn of unsafe conditions, or if
the loss was the result of an affirmative negligent act).
171. Id. § 155(15) (exemption to liability includes the absence, condition, location, malfunction,
removal or destruction of traffic signs or signals; however, there are some qualifications to this
exemption).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 155.1. It appears the legislature wished to give these transportation agencies addi-
tional time to get their houses in order, before exposing them to increased liability.
174. Id. § 155(14). From the wording of this exception, it appears immaterial whether the
claimant receives full or any compensation for his injury from these alternative sources.
175. Id. § 155(16) (exception not limited to Oklahoma law).
176. Id. § 155(26).
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state or political subdivision177 and claims based on product liability or
breach of warranty 178 are also excluded. Further, claims resulting from
the theft of money left in the custody of a government employee, 179
claims based on the theory of attractive nuisance 80 and claims involving
unintentional misrepresentations 81 are excluded. Finally, claims result-
ing from the natural condition of state or political subdivision unim-
proved property, 18 2 and claims arising from interscholastic and other
athletic contests183 are excluded.
c. Procedural limitations
The Act contains procedural requirements, which if not complied
with fully, could result in a complete bar to the plaintiff's action.18 4 The
claimant must first present his written request for relief to the state or
political subdivision involved in the action.18 5 This request for relief
must be presented within ninety days of the date the loss occured.18 6 If
the claim is presented after this ninety day period, but within one year
from the date of loss, "any judgment in a lawsuit arising from the act
which is the subject of the claim shall be reduced by ten percent
(10%)."' I 7 If the claim is not presented within one year from the date of
loss, the plaintiff's action is "forever barred."1 88
Note that the statute of limitation period begins to run from the date
the loss occurred, not from the date the loss was discovered. There are
two exceptions to the one-year filing period for claims. First, where the
claimant is unable to present his claim due to incapacity from the injury,
he can obtain an extension of time not exceeding ninety days. 8 9 Second,
a wrongful death claim can be presented by the personal representative of
the injured party within one year from the date of the injury without a
177. Id. § 155(18) (independent contractor's employees, agents, suppliers and subcontractors are
included in this exception).
178. Id. § 155(24) (exemption to liability applies whether the basis of the claim rests on either
express or implied theories of product liability or breach of warranty).
179. Id. § 155(19) (exemption to liability does not include losses due to the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of the government employee).
180. Id. § 155(7).
181. Id. § 155(17).
182. Id. § 155(10).
183. Id. § 155(20) (exemption to liability includes any athletic contest connected with the state
or political subdivision through sponsorship or ownership of the site of the contest).
184. See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
185. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 156(A) (Supp. 1984).
186. Id. § 156(B).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. § 156(E).
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reduction in judgment. 90
Before a claimant can commence a suit against the state or political
subdivision, he must have previously submitted a claim and had that
claim denied in whole or part. 19 1 The claim is deemed denied if it is not
approved in its entirety by the state or political subdivision within ninety
days from submittal and no settlement has been reached between the par-
ties.19' The claimant must commence his suit within one hundred eighty
days after denial of the claim or his action is barred forever.1
9 3
Thus, the new law places many procedural hurdles and trapdoors in
the path of any plaintiff seeking to bring a claim against the state or
political subdivision under this Act. If plaintiff's counsel does not stay
current on the filing periods, it may result in either a reduction in recov-
ery, or a complete bar to the action. Other procedural requirements of
the Act are discussed below.
5. Additional Procedural Aspects of the Act
With respect to the statute of limitations periods discussed above,
the Act specifies what information is to be included in the initial request
for relief' 94 as well as to whom the request must be submitted.' 9 The
Act authorizes the state or political subdivision, after consulting with
legal counsel, to either settle or defend the claim.196 If a settlement is
reached, the governmental unit is further authorized by the Act to appro-
priate money for the payment of the settlement amount. However, if the
payment exceeds ten thousand dollars and any part of it is not covered by
insurance, court approval of the payment must be obtained.' 97
With respect to insurance obtained by the state or political subdivi-
sion, no evidence may be presented at trial concerning the existance of
190. Id. § 156(F).
191. Id. § 157(A).
192. Id.
193. Id. § 157(B).
194. Id. § 156(E) (claim must state the date, time, place and circumstances of the claim; the
amount of relief sought; and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the claimant and any
agent authorized to settle the claim).
195. Id. § 156(C) (claims against the state to be filed with Attorney General and agency head)
and § 156(D) (claims against political subdivision to be filed with clerk of governing body).
196. Id. § 158(A).
197. Id. If there is an insurance policy covering the state or political subdivisions, the terms of
the policy control the rights and obligations of the governmental unit and the insurance company,
with respect to investigation, settlement, payment and defense of the claim. Id. § 158(B) (any settle-
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any such insurance. '9 The state or political subdivision is not liable for
any costs, judgments or settlements paid under its insurance policy, 199
and it has the right to use any such insurance payments as a setoff against
its own liability from the same occurrence. 2" Finally, the state or polit-
ical subdivision has the right of subrogation against its insurance com-
pany, up to the limits of its policy amount.2 °1
Any action brought against the state or political subdivision must be
filed in the name of the real party in interest 22 and in no case can a
claimant file his claim or receive a recovery under a right of subroga-
tion.203 Further, all actions brought under this Act must name the state
or political subdivision as defendant 2° and in no event can an employee
of the government entity, acting within the scope of his employment, be
named as defendant.20 5 Any judgment or settlement obtained under this
Act constitutes a complete bar to any action brought by the claimant
against the government employee whose conduct gave rise to the judg-
ment or settlement.20 6 The state or political subdivision also has a right
of recovery against its employee for any judgment, settlement or defense
costs paid by the governmental unit, if the employee was acting outside
the scope of his employment or if the employee failed to cooperate in
good faith with the defense of the claim.20 7
The Act specifies that the Attorney General will defend all actions
brought under this Act, where the state has the duty to defend,208 except
where a state agency is authorized by law to use its own attorneys.20 9 In
actions against the state, service is to be made by certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the Attorney General with a copy to the head of the
agency involved.210 In actions against a political subdivision, service is to
be made as required by law in civil cases.211
198. Id. § 163(G).
199. Id. § 158(D).
200. Id.
201. Id. § 158(E).
202. Id. § 163(D).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 163(C).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 160.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 161.1 (the Act is silent as to who has the duty to defend in actions brought against a
political subdivision under this Act).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 163(E) (service must include the summons and a copy of the petition).
211. Id. § 163(F) (if no method of service is prescribed by law then service can be made on the
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Venue for actions against the state is either in the county where the
claim arose or in Oklahoma County,212 except that another county may
be selected in lieu of Oklahoma County by a state agency, board or com-
mission if it files a resolution with the Secretary of State.213 Venue for
actions brought against a political subdivision is in either the county
where the claim arose or in the county where the political subdivision is
located. 1 4
A claimant, who obtains a judgment against the state or political
subdivision for which the government entity has insurance coverage, may
use any method for obtaining payment as provided in the "policy or con-
tract or law," up to the limits of the insurance coverage.21 5 Judgments
obtained against the state which are not covered by insurance may be
paid by the state agency involved at its discretion and with the approval
of the Director of State Finance, from its available funds.216 The Act,
however, allows the state agency to take up to four years to pay off judg-
ments not covered by insurance, and no provision is made in the Act to
require the agency to pay the claimant interest on that portion of the
judgment withheld during the four year period. 1 7 Judgments obtained
against a political subdivision, for which there is no insurance coverage
available, may be paid at a rate of one-third (1/3) each year from an ap-
propriate sinking fund or, with court approval, over a period of not less
211than one year nor greater than ten years. If payment by the political
subdivision exceeds three years, the Act provides for interest to be paid
to the judgment holder.2 19 Also, the Act states that "[n]othing in it shall
be interpreted as allowing liens on public property.
220
Finally, nothing within the Act itself either abrogates or amends any
existing remedies, causes of action or claims presently held.221 Nor does
the Act apply to any claim against the state or political subdivision
which arose before the effective dates of the Act.22
2
212. Id. § 163(A).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 163(B).
215. Id. § 159(B).
216. Id. § 159(D).
217. Id. (". . . no agency shall be required to pay a judgment prior to the fiscal year next follow-
ing the fiscal year in which the judgment is obtained. Any such judgment may be paid at a rate of
one-third ('/3) per fiscal year from funds available for operation of the agency.")
218. Id. § 159(C).
219. Id. (interest rate as prescribed by law for first three years and six percent for each remaining
year).
220. Id. § 159(E).
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6. Impact of the Act
The impact the Act will have in the area of tort claims brought
against the state or political subdivision will depend heavily on the
Oklahoma courts' interpretation of the Act. As discussed above, the Act
contains many limitations to liability."2 3 Because some of these limita-
tions are vague and/or broad, the courts, through a very strict construc-
tion of the Act, could bar most types of claims brought against a
governmental entity.
224
The impact of the Act will be further restricted by the strict proce-
dural requirements that must be complied with, especially the statute of
limitation period which controls the filing of the action. 225 The effect of
the statute of limitation is compounded because the initial claim, which
must be presented and denied before a suit can be commenced, may be
denied through the inaction of the governmental entity it was presented
to.226 This silent denial could result in a plaintiff being barred from
bringing his action before he is even aware that the limitations period has
begun to run.22 7
Even when a plaintiff manages to comply with all of the Act's proce-
dural requirements and is not stopped by the court's interpretation of the
Act's liability exemption language, any recovery will be subject to the
ceilings placed on monetary recoveries by the Act.228 These ceilings will
have the effect of continuing to put the risk of loss on the injured party,
instead of on the party responsible for the wrong. Ceilings on recoveries
will also have the effect of placing the risk of loss on individuals in the
223. Based on various exemptions to liability built into the Act, there appears to be very little
substance left to what is commonly thought of as torts for which the state or its political subdivisions
may be held liable for. A government entity stands a good chance of not being held liable for the
intentional torts of its agents and employees, because the wrongful activity at issue very likely would
be found to be outside the scope of employment by a court. See supra notes 120-122 and accompa-
nying text. For non-feasance negligence cases, a court would probably hold that the government
entity was acting within its discretionary powers and, therefore, would retain its immunity, unless
there was a specific law directing the entity to act. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
In negligence causes of action based on affirmative actions of the government entity, liability would
be greatly limited by the numerous substantive and procedural limitations contained in the Act. See
supra notes 144-193 and accompanying text.
224. Historically, the courts have strictly construed any waiver of sovereign immunity. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text. Also, if the court interprets such vague exception language as
"discretionary acts" or "then current recognized standards" very broadly, a plaintiff would have an
extremely heavy burden to overcome in order to avoid a defense of sovereign immunity. See supra
notes 153-162 & 176 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
227. Id. (action barred if suit not brought within one hundred eighty days from when initial
claim "deemed" denied).
228. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
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lower income brackets. Individuals in the upper income brackets are
more likely to have the means of obtaining casualty insurance to protect
themselves from the wrongs of the state. It is unlikely that such protec-
tion is a viable option for those in lower income brackets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discussion above indicates that sovereign immunity will likely
be the rule instead of the exception in Oklahoma, even after the Act goes
into effect. Many of the injustices associated with sovereign immunity,
which historically have been criticized by courts and legal scholars alike,
will continue to plague those seeking recovery.
Because the new Act requires the extensive involvement of the
courts, the only hope an injured party may have in obtaining compensa-
tion lies in the courts' interpretive discretion. A liberal construction of
the Act would not only allow an injured party to receive some compensa-
tion, but it would also encourage the government entity or its agent to
enter into reasonable settlement negotiations with the injured party. On
the other hand a strict interpretation by the courts which favors sover-
eign immunity, would only encourage defense attorneys for the state or
political subdivision to either avoid settlements altogether or force plain-
tiffs into accepting unreasonable settlements. In either case, the result
would be to increase litigation and to burden individuals with the cost of
wrongs committed by an entity whose function is to protect as well as to
govern.
The early English kings waived their personal immunity to suit in
their own courts on a regular basis. Before forwarding claimant's peti-
tion to the court, the king would note, "let justice be done." '229 The
Oklahoma courts should follow the king's example.
George J Meyer
229. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 4.
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